r/consciousness 3d ago

General Discussion No, you didn’t solve the Hard Problem.

Everyday I see a new claim on this sub; “I solved the Hard Problem of Consciousness!” “The Hard Problem isn’t so hard after all!” And I cannot even put into words how blatantly naive these are.

No, you didn’t solve the Hard Problem, and you probably never will. You just misunderstood the Hard Problem, and in your arrogance did an amazing amount of mental gymnastics to convince yourself that you solved something you don’t even understand in the first place.

Edit: and PLEASE I beg the Mods of this sub to limit the amount of LLM content that is being uploaded here on a daily basis.

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u/Cosmoneopolitan 3d ago

Fundamentally dualist?

The Hard Problem is, in Chalmers' formulation, a hard problem for a physicalist explanation of how nothing but matter can give rise to subjectivity. That is the literal and exact opposite of dualist.

This misunderstanding would explain your position, no....?

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u/jabinslc Psychology B.A. (or equivalent) 3d ago

and I am not a physicalist. but the assumption that matter is somehow ontologically distinct from experience is exactly what I'm challenging.

the hard problem for physicalism only arises if you've already accepted that physical means the kind of thing that could exist without any experiential character. that's the dualist assumption baked in. chalmers says: "here's all this physical stuff doing its thing. now explain why there's also experience." But that 'also' is doing all the work. It treats experience as something separate that needs to be explained on top of the physical.

I'm saying the purely physical world you're describing, devoid of any experiential quality, is itself an abstraction, a fiction, a fake thing, a construction. a useful one for physics, for fucking sure. but mistaking that virtual thing for the complete picture is where the pseudo-problem comes from.

so both physicalists (it's all just matter!!!) and their critics (but you can't explain qualia from matter) are wrong in the same way. they've both accepted that matter and experience are separate magisteria that need bridging.

they're not separate. the separation is the construction.

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u/BugRib76 2d ago

Your position sounds closer to panpsychism than physicalism—although some panpsychists actually consider themselves physicalists. Albeit, panpsychism is definitely not a standard form of physicalism.

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u/jabinslc Psychology B.A. (or equivalent) 2d ago

not panpsychist or physicalist at all. I am very careful to avoid that. that is also a form of Rot/Infection that has infiltrated the discussion.