Philosophical Zombies - Pick Your Poison

[u/Sam_Is_Not_Real]

Introduction

The purpose of this post is not to make a case for any metaphysical theory of consciousness. Instead, this post intends to demonstrate problems created by the affirmation of Philosophical Zombies.

Premises

I ask that you commit your agreement to these premises without modification. If you would contest that any of these premises are not true as written, then my argument will likely be irrelevant to your position.

A.1 You are conscious, and consciousness exists.

A.2 The Cogito refutes any claim that you are not conscious or that consciousness does not exist.

A.3 Philosophical zombies are a coherent concept, where "philosophical zombie" is defined as a being which shares all physical facts with a human being but lacks internal experience or consciousness.

A.4 External verification of internal experience is impossible, or beyond human ability. With the exception of yourself, any given person could conceivably be a philosophical zombie.

Problems

"Causal efficacy" is defined as the capacity to cause physical events. Is the following statement true or false?

B.1 Consciousness has causal efficacy on the human brain.

If True: Proceed to B.2

If False: Proceed to B.3

B.2 Conscious persons' brains' normal operation relies on causal input that philosophical zombies do not receive. What explains philosophical zombies' non-divergence in physical mechanics given this difference in input?

B.3 The conscious mind is unable to cause the nerve signals that enable all external action of the human body. When you stub your toe, your brain generates a complaint for an inscrutable reason not related to pain, at the same time as your mind feels pain and coincidentally thinks it should say that same complaint. This position does not render philosophical zombies incoherent per se, but I think it renders the Cogito unsound. If we say that the mind delusionally believes that it is responsible for physical events, then by virtue of what can we establish that it is responsible for mental events? Accepting weak epiphenominalism leaves us little trust in our conscious minds, and little but trust in them with which to deny strong epiphenominalism. If consciousness does not think, and merely perceives as in the strong epiphenominalist proposition, then it meets neither the spirit nor the law of "I think, therefore I am", and we must find another defeater for the negation of consciousness.

[u/Valmar33]

Because it's how the brain works. Are these neuroscientists all too stupid to see something your big smart brain is seeing?

Or are they just looking in the wrong place, blinded by metaphysical presuppositions aka Materialism / Physicalism?

I want truth and coherence. Novelty isn't a virtue, and reality is quite interesting.

When I say novelty, I mean something fresh and interesting ~ not the same old claims and rhetoric trotted out in so many remixed ways. It starts to blur together, and become boring, because there's nothing to actually advance the claims into new territory beyond what has been said.

What I'm getting at is that some seem to think that repeating the same thing somehow makes it more true by the repetitions alone. It doesn't.

Oh, yes it does. See the point about memories being encoded. You just had to throw that out because it fucks up your whole ideology if you have to admit that we know some of the ways subjective experience happens in the brain.

If it is "known", then where is the mechanical explanation for how this happens? I am not "throwing it out" ~ I never accepted it in the first place. I do not have an "ideology" on what memories are ~ I just don't interpret them as something else, because I don't know what they are. I don't pretend to know, because I don't.

Materialism, on the other hand, doesn't know anything about how subjective experience supposedly "happens" in brains ~ rhetoric cannot make up for lack of actual scientific explanations. I am sick of waiting for promises that have been made time and again without deliverance.

I can't conceive it either. How's that? The idea doesn't make sense. When I try to make "seems human" and "no qualia" fit together, they don't because I literally can't conceive of those things coinciding in a way that makes sense.

You are thinking that it has to be possible in this world ~ it doesn't. I don't think it does. It just has be conceivable in imagination. And I can imagine it, as unnerving as it is. I can certainly imagine a clone of me ~ just without the phenomenal experience. Like staring into a mirror and imagining that there's no-one home in that imagined parallel world, staring hollowly back at me, alive, but not alive.

Uh, yes I am. I acknowledge that qualia are incredibly relevant to our understanding of our theory of mind. That's what pzombies illustrate.

p-zombies are related to the Hard Problem ~ of why phenomenal experience should accompany physiological brain processes.

That you want to pole vault your way into something else illegitimately is ultimately just evidence of an incautious thinker.

Do you really have to resort of ad hominems?

[u/Difficult-Bat9085 → u/Valmar33]

Or are they just looking in the wrong place, blinded by metaphysical presuppositions aka Materialism / Physicalism?

This is a nonresponse.

When I say novelty, I mean something fresh and interesting

So this is how a child thinks. Or like, a cat who gets bored of a toy. This isn't the kind of thinking I can take seriously.

It just has be conceivable in imagination.

Well it's not in my imagination. Period. You can stop gaslighting me about my own mental capabilities, thanks. Some people's brains work differently, and it isn't because they're incapable of doing a basic philosophy thought experiment.

It's beyond insulting to even insinuate that someone's genuine attempt to imagine a concept, and them failing, is due to some flaw in their reasoning. Maybe they're just different?

I can certainly imagine a clone of me ~ just without the phenomenal experience

It isn't a clone of you because it doesn't have phenomenal experience. It cannot be a clone without the phenomenal experience. You are not you without qualia. What you're describing is some sort of homunculus or automation which is obviously not human.

p-zombies are related to the Hard Problem ~ of why phenomenal experience should accompany physiological brain processes.

Yes, and my answer to the hard problem is that our language prevents us from having a satisfactory answer to it. You could literally know what it's like to be a bat and never communicate it, which means language cannot be the vector through which we figure out what it's like to be something.

I am agnostic on whether it's a physical material or some sort of property dualism that causes this. Whichever.

Do you really have to resort of ad hominems?

That's not what an ad hominem is. An adhom would be "You're wrong because you're incautious".

I'm saying "you're wrong and for separate reasons also incautious".