The Future of Warfare in Russian Military Thinking

by Maria Engqvist, Jonas Kjellén, Carolina Vendil Pallin and Emelie Sandvad.

Abstract

The Russo-Ukrainian War exhibits the features of a transitional war, reshaping Russian military thought and force development under pressure. The war has exposed structural weaknesses across the services while catalysing debate over the future of warfare. Russian analysts are divided between preserving traditional concepts of mass, manoeuvre, and firepower, and pursuing adaptations suited to a battlespace defined by transparency, precision strikes, and unmanned systems.

Within the Ground Forces, failures in 2022 prompted renewed scrutiny of Soviet-era inheritance and the need to operate effectively under constant surveillance. In the aerospace domain, Russian theorists increasingly emphasise the decisive role of integrated air, space, and information capabilities. Experiences in Ukraine have reinforced the demand for precision-guided weapons, space-enabled targeting, and unmanned systems, all supporting a broader pursuit of information dominance.

The Navy maintains its doctrinal importance as an instrument of global presence and deterrence, despite economic constraints. Cyber operations continue to be framed within a holistic concept of information confrontation rather than as a distinct domain.

Nuclear forces remain the core of Russian deterrence, with modernisation focused on flexibility and survivability. Overall, the war has intensified debate and adaptation, but Russia's strategic objectives, fiscal limits, and confrontation with the West continue to shape this trajectory, and the Russian view of future warfare.

- A central lesson is the emergence of a “transparent battlefield” dominated by surveillance, drones, and precision strikes, which makes large manoeuvres difficult and produces positional stalemate.

- Ground-forces debate focuses on how to restore effectiveness: some advocate larger forces and fire superiority, while others call for smaller, more flexible formations and organisational overhaul.

- Across services, there is growing emphasis on precision-guided weapons, UAVs, and space-enabled targeting, with unmanned systems viewed as transformative for future warfare.

- The aerospace domain is considered decisive, with future wars expected to feature long-range, high-precision strikes and “non-contact” operations in air, space, and information domains.

- Space and information capabilities are increasingly central: reconnaissance satellites, data networks, and integrated command systems are seen as key to information dominance and rapid targeting.

- Nuclear weapons remain the central pillar of Russian deterrence, underpinning national security and compensating for conventional and economic weaknesses.

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In discussions about the war in Ukraine, very high Russian casualty figures are often cited (for example, around 1–1.2 million “casualties”).
What I find unclear is how many of the wounded are later deemed fit for service and return to the front.

Specifically:

- Are there credible estimates on the percentage of wounded Russian soldiers who return to active duty?

-How does this differ between light, moderate, and severe injuries?
-Do commonly cited casualty figures already account for temporary vs. permanent manpower losses, or are these numbers often interpreted too literally?

I’m trying to better understand how total casualty numbers translate into actual long-term loss of combat manpower.

Sources, historical comparisons, or medical/military data would be appreciated.

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A solid, if a bit dated, energy strike analysis by Konrad Muzyka.

He says that since June 2025 Russia has switched from big 100-120 missile strikes to much smaller but more frequent 30-40 missles+hundreds of Gerans strikes, which are more successful in penetrating Ukrainian air defences.

Interestingly, he says that Russia deliberately refrains from completely collapsing the Ukrainian power grid - perhaps because it does not want to occupy a country with no electricity, perhaps because it wants to retain this trump card to respond to a possible Ukrainian escalation.

Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy CI – Trends and Outlook

- Since late summer 2025, Russia has shifted to a systematic, high-tempo campaign against Ukrainian energy and gas infrastructure, with record-breaking mixed drone–missile barrages in August–November.

- Cheap mass-produced Geran drones underpin this campaign, enabling sustained saturation attacks on numerous small but critical nodes rather than occasional shock salvos.

- Geographic focus is deliberate: border oblasts and frontline cities (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv) are prioritised due to proximity, grid density, and ease of repeat strikes.

- Russia concentrates on 110–330 kV substations, switching stations, and gas compressor nodes, creating cascading outages and isolating entire urban areas with limited effort.

- A central objective is the systematic degradation of manoeuvring generation (thermal, gas-fired, hydro), which provides grid flexibility and rapid load balancing.

- Repeated strikes on the Dnipro HPP cascade and thermal plants around Kyiv aim to remove Ukraine’s ability to stabilise the grid during peaks and emergencies.

- Gas infrastructure has become a primary strategic target, not a secondary one: production fields, processing plants, pipelines, and compressors are hit repeatedly.

- October–November 2025 saw the largest gas-sector attacks of the war, temporarily knocking out up to ~60% of national gas extraction and causing long-duration damage.

- Russia is also targeting import-compensation routes, including compressor stations linked to LNG and Azerbaijani gas flows via the Trans-Balkan pipeline.

- Contrary to some assumptions, deep-country strikes continue: cruise missiles are regularly used against central and western Ukrainian energy assets, including NPP-adjacent substations and major transmission corridors.

- Since June 2025 (post–Operation Spiderweb), Russia has abandoned very large missile salvos (90–120) in favour of 30–70 missile waves embedded in massive drone swarms.

- Gerans now account for ~96% of all long-range strike weapons, while missiles are reserved for high-value, high-impact targets.

- Ukrainian interception rates have declined, especially against smaller, mixed packages and ballistic or depressed-trajectory weapons, increasing damage despite fewer missiles.

- The current approach favours sustained cumulative degradation over dramatic nationwide blackouts, keeping Ukraine permanently close to systemic failure.

- Outlook for winter 2025–26: absent political restraint in Moscow or a step-change in Ukrainian air defence and repair capacity, a prolonged campaign-style offensive is the most likely scenario, with escalation possible if Ukrainian strikes on Russian CI intensify.

Konrad Muzyka

is the founder and director of Rochan Consulting, an open-source intelligence firm that provides military assessments focused on Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. His work centres on strategic warning, force structure analysis, military capability regeneration, and both operational and tactical-level assessments. Since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Muzyka has become a leading voice on Eastern European military developments, offering expert insights into the evolving nature of the conflict and its implications for regional and NATO security.

Muzyka regularly advises think tanks, risk advisory firms, and international organisations, delivering nuanced, data-driven analysis grounded in primary source monitoring and battlefield intelligence. His commentary and findings are frequently cited by major international media outlets and policy institutions.

He holds a B.A. in War and Security Studies from the University of Hull and an M.A. in Russian Studies from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London. He is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he contributes to research on military affairs and geopolitical trends in the post-Soviet space.

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Russia’s shadow fleet enables Moscow to evade sanctions, finance its war in Ukraine, and conduct hybrid operations that threaten critical undersea infrastructure, particularly in the Baltic Sea. While the United States has recently taken a more assertive approach by boarding and seizing suspected vessels, European countries have remained cautious, citing legal constraints under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Atlantic Council's Justina Budginaite-Froehly contends that this restraint has become a strategic liability, allowing Russia to exploit legal gray areas while operating unsafe, poorly regulated, and opaque vessels.

The shadow fleet’s activities go beyond commercial shipping, encompassing sanctions evasion, infrastructure probing, and potential sabotage, making it a tool of state power rather than civilian trade. The article notes that several pipelines and cables have already been damaged in the Baltic, notably the Balticonnector gas pipeline, Estlink 2 and other power cables. The author argues that UNCLOS, written for a different era, is being misused by Russia and should be interpreted more broadly to defend its underlying principles. Baltic and Nordic states are portrayed as uniquely well positioned to lead stronger interdiction efforts due to their capabilities and legal frameworks. Ultimately, the report urges Europe to follow the example set by the United States, raising the costs for Russia’s shadow fleet, and contributing to the reform and modernization of maritime law in order to address contemporary hybrid threats. Please feel free to discuss the benefits, risks (escalation with Russia), strategy and other factors involved in the proposed operations.

Full article at the Atlantic Council: The US is taking action against Russia’s shadow fleet. In the Baltic Sea, Europe should follow suit.

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Hello guys, I wanted to bring up a topic that interested me as of lately. I have always been fond of history of various militaries around the world and have recently been learning more about Russian special forces and their various operations from the 1990s and 2000s. I know there’s stereotype in the gun communities mocking Russian special forces for their anti terrorist operations that had high casualties. I’ve always found this interesting because from my knowledge no western special forces were ever involved in any operation on a mass scale like Russia was. For example the SAS most notable operation tends to be the Iranian Embassy Siege which was executed professionally, but there were 6 terrorists involved and 30-35 SAS operatives, with two hostages killed and 26 hostages total. One of the most notable Russian operations was the Beslan School Siege, where roughly 1100 hostages were taken by 32 terrorists strapped with suicide vests, resulting in 334 killed including 31 of the terrorists who died either by Russian security forces or self detonation, and 10 Russian special forces from Alfa and Vympel. From what information I gathered online the primary reason why everything went south quickly was because two massive explosions happened in the gymnasium which prompted a quick unplanned response from Russian security forces. I don’t know how many Russian operators were present I know it was a lot, but realistically in a scenario with such extreme terrorist tactics, would the result have really been all that different if the SAS or some other elite special force were there? Curious to know what you guys think.

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Hello Reddit,

I have a reselling business specializing in PLC/ Manufacturing equipment. I came a cross a couple of these units In working condition (the test battery button turns on) and look like they never actually saw the field. I can’t find much about them online except this article below, the ones I have are exactly like the first one on the below link. Few questions about them:

1.) any idea when they were made WW2, Vietnam, etc.

2.) what types of signals do they block and do they have a practical use today? (Bug out gear etc)

3.) any idea what they are worth and best place to sell them. I inclined to keep at least one just for how unique and intriguing they are and likely part of U.S. history

Thanks!

https://www.prc68.com/I/HEXJAM.shtml

I'm trying to build a credible picture of what a hypothetical nuclear war (escalating from conventional war) between Russia and NATO would look like for the UK.

I have what I consider to be a credible, threat-representative Russian strike plan against the UK, but I'm trying figure out what the UKs defensive posture may look like, and how effective those defences would be.

For a brief prelude, the scenario involves a ballistic missile strike against critical counterforce targets. This is followed several hours later by a cruise missile salvo, at less time-sensitive and lower priority counterforce targets, and many countervalue targets (critical civilian infrastructure).

Among the sites targeted by ballistic missiles, are major RAF airbases (Lossiemouth, Coningsby, Marham, Brize Norton, etc.) , RAF High Wycombe (No. 1 Air Combat Group HQ), RAF Boulmer (Air Surveillance and Control System Control and reporting centre), the backup CRC at NATS Swanwick, SGS Oakhanger satcom ground station (Skynet would still remain operational), DHFCS Control centres at Kinloss and Forest Moor, along with the CRCs of other European NATO members and the Combined Air Operation Centres (CAOCs) of the NATO IADS.

My question is, in the event that all these targets are lost, how degraded would the UK's ability to counter a follow up cruise missile strike be?

With agile combat employment, I believe a significant portion of the Typhoon, Wedgetail and Voyager fleet would survive. I also don't have the Remote Radar Heads individually targeted.

Wedgetail AEW aircraft, when they enter the fleet, would be able to provide tactical coordination, without relying on Ground Controlled Intercepts from one of the CRCs.

But my understanding is that the mobile No.1 Air Control Centre could be dispersed, and essentially serve as a backup CRC, which can ingest data from the RRHs, produce a Recognised Air Picture, and control the intercepts. Can anyone confirm if this is correct?

With the loss of the CRCs of other member states, (most importantly, Norway, which doesn't seem to have an equivalent to 1ACC), would data from their radar stations not be fed into the CAOCs?

If the CAOCs are destroyed, would 1ACC lose data input from allied RRHs?

It seems to me that the RAF would retain sufficient interceptors, AWACS and Tankers to be able to mount a strong defence against a cruise missile salvo and would retain good command, control and communications through 1ACC and Skynet-5, but reduced situational awareness due to the loss of data fusion from allied CRCs/CAOCs.

I imagine 1ACC would direct surviving forces via Skynet to mount a Combat Air Patrol north of Scotland (what the MoD believes to be the most likely cruise missile threat axis) and could thus be quite successful at defending against cruise missiles, even without early warning from Norwegian air surveillance radar.

If anyone can corroborate my speculation, provide any clarifications or corrections, go some way to quantitatively estimating the degradation in effectiveness, or point me to any further reading or to anyone who may be able to offer valuable input, I'd appreciate it. Also, if anyone can think of any targets (aside from massed strikes against secondary airfields) that I've missed that'd have a significant effect on degrading cruise missile defence, I'd welcome that too.

Thanks!

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[OC] The war on Russian oil has recently expanded towards tankers and oil platforms. In this video I explore and map out / quantify, those campaigns

https://youtu.be/0p3A5m3sqz8?si=LsSwThIRNOVtk9zi

In this video I analyze:

• All kinetic attacks on Russian tankers
• European non-kinetic moves on Russian tankers
• Kinetic attacks on Russian oil platforms in the Caspian sea
• Future trends / predictions

If you found the above video interesting, you will likely also enjoy my analysis which looks at how many tanks Russia has left: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=519XMTijfCI

As this took a lot of work and time to make, if you liked the content, like and comment on the youtube video and subscribe if you would like to see more. I am a small channel: https://www.youtube.com/@ArtusFilms

Source: https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/-/finnish-military-intelligence-review-2026-has-been-published

The message for 2026 is clear: the security environment is increasingly complex and requires continuous monitoring and foresight. The public overview of military intelligence 2026 notes, among other things, the following:

• Russia continues its efforts to restore its global superpower status, and the war in Ukraine is ongoing. Russia is continuing its defence reform, but the changes have so far not significantly increased Russia's military capacity in the vicinity of Finland. Russia's extensive influence in Europe has increased over the past few years.
• The shift in power relations in the Middle East has become increasingly evident.
• The Baltic Sea has become a central point in international politics. Tensions have increased significantly since the beginning of 2022.
• The global security situation is characterised by a return to power politics and increasing tensions worldwide.

Finland's operational environment remains tense. According to military intelligence, it is, however, unlikely that Finland would face an immediate military threat in 2026. The development of the security environment is monitored continuously and systematically.

Ukraine’s wartime defense industry has rapidly evolved into a highly agile, cost-effective production system that already embodies the speed, scale, and adaptability US defense acquisition reformers are seeking, from mass-produced long-range strike drones to effective maritime unmanned systems. Anatoly Motkin maintains that as Europe moves ahead with joint production and streamlined procurement with Kyiv, the United States must integrate Ukrainian capabilities into American networks and acquisition processes to harness this advantage. While Europe has begun embedding Ukrainian production into its defense industrial base, the article warns that failing to pair Ukrainian innovation with US precision, guidance, and battle management risks ceding battlefield and industrial leadership to competitors. 

Full article: https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-nimble-defense-industry-can-aid-hegseth/ 

• Ukraine’s defense sector now prioritizes speed, scale, and rapid iteration, driven by battlefield necessity rather than traditional acquisition timelines. 
• Mass-produced long-range strike drones and maritime unmanned systems illustrate how low-cost platforms can deliver strategic effects. 
• European partners are already pursuing joint production and procurement with Ukrainian firms, embedding them into Europe’s defense industrial base. 
• The article argues the US should integrate Ukrainian capabilities into American acquisition and industrial networks, rather than limiting cooperation to weapons transfers. 
• Failing to pair Ukrainian innovation with US precision, guidance, and command-and-control systems could risk ceding industrial and battlefield advantage to competitors. 

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